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Foreword
Part of the National Research Program 68 financed by the Swiss national science
foundation through the grant number 406840_143057, the SUstainable Management
of SOil as a Resource (SUMSOR) project asked five main research questions (Nahrath
et al., 2012):
1. What are the main economic, demographic, as well as institutional, political and
fiscal drivers of spatial development in different types of spaces in Switzerland
(urban, peri-urban, mountainous)?
2. What are the impacts of spatial development on economic and ecological soil
added and reduced values in the different types of spaces?
3. What are the existing policy instruments currently dealing, in Switzerland and
abroad, with the question of added(reduced value redistribution?
4. What are the most relevant (sets of) policy instruments that allow to integrate
objectives in terms of soil quality into densification strategies? To what extent
are the (sets of) policy instruments able to create "win-win" situations?
5. What are the main institutional conditions (or changes required) for the im-
plementation of these policy instruments in the Swiss institutional regime of
soil?
In order to answer these questions, one of the means chosen by the research team
was to elaborate working papers that analyse the different types of spaces in Switzer-
land: one working paper focusses on the peri-urban region of Oberaargau (Viallon,
2016a); two working papers analyse urban dynamics in the region of Lausanne (Vial-
lon, 2016c,b).
The present working paper analyses the politics of land policy instruments im-
plementation in Cheseaux, a commune located at the border of the agglomeration of
Lausanne. The paper studies the impact of communal land policy, in particular the
communal use of land policy instruments, on local arrangements negotiated between
political-administrative authorities and landowners.
The document’s content has been discussed with the Ph.D. supervisors of the au-
thor, Prof. Stéphane Nahrath (University of Lausanne) and Prof. Géraldine Pflieger
(University of Geneva). The proof reading has been done by Daniel Baumgartel,
teaching assistant at the English Department of the University of Lausanne.
I would like to thank my supervisors and proof reader for their comments on
previous versions of this document. I would also like to thank Emilie Baud with
whom I did the field work, Denis Leroy, who granted us access to the archives of the
spatial planning Office of the Canton of Vaud for our research, and the persons who
granted us time for an interview.
Land improvement syndicate
in Cheseaux
This case study analyses the implementation of the land policy instrument land im-
provement syndicate (LIS) in the commune of Cheseaux, Canton Vaud. The instru-
ment consists of both joint and coordinated use of land readjustment and zoning.
The conditions for the instrument’s implementation are of central importance to this
thesis, because the LIS is one of the few intrinsically redistributive instruments in
Swiss land use planning legislation. This case is structured as follows:
− section 1 provides a description of the instrument and its functions;
− section 2 presents the land use planning and land use changes in the commune
over the past 25 years, in particular, changes within the LIS’ perimeter;
− section 3 presents contextual factors which help explain the previously analysed
changes;
− section 4 explains which legal constraints have played a role in the evolution
of land use planning and land uses; it focusses particularly on the procedural
factors that condition the LIS’ functioning;
− section 5 analyses how the involved actors have utilized available rules in order
to influence the local regulatory arrangements observed during the instrument’s
implementation process.
− section 6 summarizes the instrument’s value creation and distribution capacity,
its compatibility with other value capture instruments, and its possibilities and
limits for solving redistributive issues on a regional scale.
1 Presentation of the LIS
Based on the terminology used by Weber et al. (2011), I define the land improvement Coordination through the
creation of added
economic value
syndicate (LIS) as a process of coordination between zoning, land readjustment and
land service, financed through the creation of added economic value within a defined
perimeter. The LIS pursues two main goals:
1. reorganise land property according to a planned zoning operation that creates
added value on land;
2. realise land service (roads, water adduction, sewer, public spaces, landscape,
etc.).
Initially, the LIS was created to overcome contentious situations (such as: dis- An instrument meant to
overcome redistributive
issues
agreements between landowners, an irregular property shape, financial risks in the
redevelopment of brownfields), and ensure the equitable redistribution of added and
reduced values between landowners (for example, a building zone or intermediary zone
which has been oversized, or badly located and should be reduced and/or relocated)
(Prélaz-Droux, 2008). The LIS, as Derrière-le-château analysed here, combined a
property shape inadequate for development with a wide intermediary zone that had
been undeveloped for over 20 years (see section 1).
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Uses of the LIS in the Canton of Vaud
Since the 1950’s, land readjustment has been used widely in Vaud (as well as greater
Switzerland) for agricultural purposes. The aim was to make agricultural land fit
for machinery and increase food production through increases in the size of plots, by
burying rivers, and by covering paths with concrete (Courdesse, 2014).
More recent uses in the canton of Vaud focus on urban development and on theAn instrument to solve
the problem of
"intermediary zones"
coordination between zoning plans and the property structure. More specifically, the
LIS has been used to reduce the intermediary zone. In fact, a high number of Canton
Vaud’s zoning plans elaborated in the 1970’s featured wide surfaces zones as an inter-
mediary. The zones’ existence dates back to the 1960’s, a period in which communes
defined huge building zones (the constructibility of these zones was suspended by the
Federal urgent decree in 1972). Subsequently, in order to satisfy federal prescriptions
without removing the landowners’ potential rights, the commune zoned vast parts
of the zones affected by the federal decree as intermediary zones (Nahrath, 2003,
347,351). These zones were defined as unbuildable and intended as the future build-
ing zones of the commune. Over the years, wide parts of these intermediate zones
remained unchanged, together with the landowners’ expectations that these zones
would be developed at some point. In the case of Cheseaux, the contributions of the
LIS Derrière-le-château have reduced a portion of the commune’s intermediary zone.
Main procedural steps of the LIS
The core element of the LIS is the coordination and joint redefinition of property rightsJoint redefinition of
property rights... and public policies applying to a given perimeter. The property rights dimension is
addressed through a public law assembly composed of all landowners in the adopted
perimeter1. This assembly seeks to approve (by majority vote) a set of elements that
are presented in more detail in section 4.1:
1. the approval of the feasibility study;
2. the definition of the perimeter;
3. the modification of property lines;
4. the redistribution of property surfaces;
5. the redistribution of the use rights linked to the plots;
6. the modification, creation, and elimination of easements;
7. the service of land and underlying costs;
8. operational costs of the LIS.
The zoning plan or local development plan defines and locates the landowners’...and public policies
use rights in the considered perimeter in accordance with public policies such as:
location of constructions, building type, usage type, plot ratio, aesthetics, financial
contributions, etc. Both the property rights transfer and the local development plan
must be approved simultaneously by the cantonal authority.
In order to guarantee the financial viability of the process and ensure the landown-Elaboration of a
feasibility study ers’ approval, a feasibility study is conducted by a geometer, urban planner and notary
(i.e. the experts’ commission) mandated by the landowners2. This feasibility study
consists of a gross evaluation of the landowners’ existing properties (physical con-
straints on land, easements, etc.) and their economic value. Taken into consideration
as well, is the possible future state of property, as based on:
1. communal plans in terms of future land use;
2. the wishes of the landowners (land for development, agricultural land, financial
compensation);
1If certain plots within the perimeter are already developed, these landowners are frequently
"neutralized" (withdrawn from the perimeter) and do not pay for the LIS’ costs, nor benefit from
additional development rights.
2Art. 85 of the Loi du 29 novembre 1961 sur les améliorations foncières, SR-VD 913.11.
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3. the future land value, which is based on the potential of development and on
additional constraints given by communal building regulations.
Once the feasibility study is approved by the landowners, a local development Detailed examination of
future land use, costs and
benefits sharing
plan is established that defines plot ratios, estimates land service costs, and provides
a more detailed analysis of the available options in terms of development. Based on
landowner wishes, and their existing properties, the experts commission suggests a
new property structure and negotiates with the landowners on the location and the
constraints linked to their future properties, as well as the landowner’s contribution
to land service costs. The cost of land service should be proportionate to the surface
and value of the initial property structure.
When an agreement is reached, the local development plan and the proposed prop- Property transfer,
approval of zoning
regulations and land
service
erty structure are submitted to the communal legislative body for adoption. When
both documents are approved by the cantonal authority, the property transfer is
effected, and the land is serviced. Once the infrastructure is built, a final cost break-
down is made, distributing payments equally between landowners. The syndicate is
dissolved after the distribution of payments.
Having provided a brief outline of the instrument, the next section analyses the
historical context of the implementation of the LIS in Cheseaux Derrière-le-château.
It becomes evident that the situation had been blocked for decades due to the po-
tential establishment of an airfield in the neighbour commune of Etagnières. With
the removal of the project (that a group of local inhabitants perceived as a threat to
the region’s quietness and rural character), major successive land reforms have been
initiated.
2 Land use planning and land use changes
Present development cannot be understood without looking at the past events that Two stages of communal
planninghave shaped communal planning decisions over the last decades. Between 1978 and
2016, the story of Cheseaux’s land use planning and land use changes can be separated
into two broad overlapping phases:
1. the first phase comprises the planning, adoption and realisation of the com-
mune’s bypass road (Zuppinger, 1986);
2. the second phase consists of the communal agricultural land readjustment ne-
cessary for the realisation of the bypass road, and of the two land improvement
syndicates Derrière-le-château and Nonceret that followed the road’s construc-
tion. The temporal succession of the three land readjustment procedures is
central to the understanding of the dynamics of communal land policy. The LIS
Derrière-le-château is studied in detail in this case study, whereas the LIS Non-
ceret is still in an early stage and currently blocked by the federal moratorium
subsequent to the revision of the federal land use planning act in 2014.
2.1 Land use planning changes in 1978, and land use changes
from 1978 to 2000
The first communal building regulations and zoning plan were adopted in 1978. At
that time, the commune defined three main building zones as the sites of future devel-
opment (whose development plans were to be elaborated in separate plans) (Commune
of Cheseaux, 1978). Wide surfaces of agricultural land in the east, west and north of
the village were zoned "intermediary", i.e. meant to be developed over a longer time
frame then standard building zones. At that time, the intermediary zone’s precise
shape and uses were uncertain, because development depended upon two elements:
1. the potential construction of an airfield: this regional infrastructure construction
would have had a significant impact on the neighbouring communes, and would
have required a road service coordinated with existing infrastructure;
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2. the construction of a bypass road for Cheseaux and possibly the neighbour
communes, which was politically linked to the construction of the airfield. In the
zoning plan of 1978, the shape of the intermediary zone was defined according to
one of the possible routes that had been elaborated for the commune’s bypass3.
At the end of the second world war, the canton of Vaud was looking for a siteAn airfield looking for a
location that could host a new airfield. The sites considered by the authorities were located
in the communes of Ecublens (west of Lausanne) and Etagnières (a neighbour of
Cheseaux, north of Lausanne), but two cantonal popular votes (in 1946 and 1966)
rejected proposalsto finance the project.
In parallel, from the 1960s onwards, the canton tried to reduce the traffic over-Solution to traffic issues
blocked... load on the cantonal road between Lausanne, Echallens and Yverdon. The portion
of road intersecting both Etagnières and Cheseaux, experienced a large part of the
traffic overload and its subsequent negative effects. In 1967, the cantonal legislative
body adopted funding for the construction of a bypass road that would have circum-
vented Cheseaux and several other villages by the east. However, in-depth studies
of the traffic at the regional scale (other roads connect in the immediate southern
and western border of Cheseaux) as well as the anticipated extension of Cheseaux’s
building zone in the east, called this choice into question, and in 1970, led the canton
to propose a new bypass road that circumvented the villages through the west.
This proposal was fought by the opponents to the airfield, who considered the..due to the threat of an
airfield road to be a "disguised cantonal support" that would have serviced the future airfield
(Zuppinger, 1986, 13). After a popular vote on the road’s credit in 1974, the project
was abandoned and the canton opted for a smaller bypass alternative limited to the
sole commune of Cheseaux. In 1978, the new plans were submitted to public hearing,
opponents attacked them, and the plans were temporarily blocked from approval.
The same year (1978), the first communal zoning plan was adopted. The planAdoption of the
communal zoning plan contained western limits to future development, as defined by the border between the
intermediary and agricultural zone (see figure 1. These limits were set at that time
according to the projected plans for the small bypass road for Cheseaux.
With the motorway between Lausanne and Yverdon put into service during thatFive new bypass solutions
considered time, the canton revised its plans for the bypass road and conducted further studies.
When it presented the bypass project to the communal authorities in 1983, the oppon-
ents to the airfield had withdrawn, because the federal concession for the airfield had
expired. However, other opponents appeared, concerned about the western bypass’
ability to reduce the traffic in the center of Cheseaux. These opponents promoted a
plan for a tunnel straight through the village. This solution was meant to minimise
the length of the bypass, and thus incentivise use by commuters. Communal funds
were supposed to finance a comparative study of the two possibilities, but the ne-
cessary funding was refused by the communal legislative body in 1984, leaving the
canton to pay for the study. Ultimately, five solutions were considered: one bypass
by the east, two bypasses by the west, one bypass under the village center and one
solution involving only improvements to the existing roads.
According to U. Zuppinger (1986), the initial discrepancy between the planningCompromise between
cantonal and local
proposal
objectives the bypass road was meant to achieve (among which the service of the
airfield), and the political stakes these objectives represented, limited the acceptab-
ility of the bypass road for a long time. The first comparative study was mandated
relatively recently, in 1983. Prior studies considered only one solution at a time, and
neglected unsettled political matters such as the airfield, the traffic provided by the
other roads crossing near Cheseaux, and the planned urban expansion in the east.
In 1990, two solutions were discussed: construction of a tunnel under the city
centre or construction of a western bypass road relatively close to the village (that
approximately met the limits of the intermediary zone defined in 1978), the bypass
being supported by the canton. The final solution decided by the canton in 1991
consisted of a blend of both options: the bypass road circumvented the village, but
was buried at the demands of the inhabitants.
Between 1978 and 2001, existing building zones in the north, as well as parts ofMandatory land
readjustment building zones in the south and in the east were developed. The eastern and western
3R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, geometer and urban planner, interviewed in Echallens 14 Janu-
ary 2016.
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intermediary zones of the village remained undeveloped until the definitive plans of the
bypass road were adopted in 1991. The same year, the canton launched a mandatory
land readjustment4 on a perimeter of approximately 85 hectares. At the request of
the involved landowners, the land readjustment’s perimeter was extended in 1993 to
cover almost the entirety of the commune’s agricultural zone. It was extended further
in 1994 to adjacent plots in Morrens, the neighbour commune (Besson and Courdesse,
1999).
The problem of the bypass road addressed, the commune could consider the defin- Simultaneous redefinition
of public policies and
property rights
ition of building zones in the east and west of the village. In order to do so, the com-
munal executive body launched the revision of building regulations in 1994 (Baud,
2016, 62), at the same time the agricultural land readjustment took place. The sim-
ultaneous redefinition of zoning and of the property structure granted the commune
the opportunity to elaborate a strategy combining both dimensions.
The communal plans to extend the housing zone made the issue of the deprecated Derrière-le-château as
ideal location for future
school
and soon to be undersized primary school salient (Baud, 2016, 69). The perimeter
of Derrière-le-château appears as the best suited location for the development of the
new school, because it is the most central, undeveloped zone of the village, and the
location of the current primary school.
Based on the population growth previsions and on the imminent development in Combined use of three
land policy instrumentsthe east of the village (a.o. the area of Cologny), the matter of the future school should
be solved quickly. Advised by the communal planner and the geometer in charge of
the bypass road’s land readjustment, the commune conditioned the development of
Derrière-le-château to the creation of a land improvement syndicate, an instrument
that would redefine property rights and zoning in the intermediate zone close to the
village centre. To expedite the implementation of the instrument, the communal
executive body mandated a feasibility study5 for the future LIS Derrière-le-château
in 2000, before the new building regulations were approved and the land readjustment
procedure from the bypass road entirely finished (Leroy, 2008).
2.2 Land use planning changes in 2001 and land use changes
from 2001 to 2016
The new communal building regulations were adopted by the communal legislative Revision of communal
structure planbody in 1999, and approved by the canton in 2001. Studied changes relevant to the
value redistribution process:
− zoning in the eastern part of the village was suspended: several hectares of
intermediate zone converted to agricultural zone;
− the intermediate zone in the west of the village was enlarged slightly in order
to match the existing property shape ( the boundaries of some plots traversed
the intermediary and the agricultural zones).
− the western intermediary zone was divided into two smaller perimeters: Derrière-
le-château and Nonceret;
− within the two perimeters, zoning and development of the plots within were
conditioned upon the creation of a land improvement syndicate.
In 2000, a local structure plan specifying the commune’s intentions regarding the Planning of the future
LIS ongoingperimeter near Cheseaux’s castle entered into force, and the feasibility study was
approved. At this time, there was no further planning regarding the second perimeter
of Nonceret.
Once the feasibility study had been approved by the landowners, the shape of the
property within the LIS perimeter was redesigned, and new use rights were defined
by a 2003 local development plan. The intermediary zone within the LIS perimeter
was substituted by approximately 3/5 agricultural zone and 2/5 building zone. Land
service and development of the new building zone were initiated in 2005.
4In order to build a cantonal road, cantonal law foresees a mandatory land readjustment within
30 meters of the road’s future trace (art. 14 and 36 of the Loi sur les routes LRou, RS-VD 725.01).
5Art. 19a of the Loi vaudoise sur les améliorations foncières LAF, RS-VD 913.11.
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Since 2001, other areas have been developed: several hectares of building zone
reserves in the southeast (Cologny area, near the sawmill) and southwest (Sorécot,
Sorécot ouest). As of 2016, building zone reserves are within the legal limits (see
section 4.3).
After close to 30 years of political uncertainty, the adoption of definitive plans for
the bypass road allowed the commune to redefine planning documents in the west of
Cheseaux and lay the foundations for the creation of two successive land improve-
ment syndicates. The temporal overlap between the use of the instruments allowed
the commune to quickly act to reduce the intermediate zone and define an optimal
location for its future school. As the next section shows, the simultaneous land read-
justment due to both the bypass road and the LIS Derrière-le-château also granted
the commune the possibility to acquire, exchange and relocate its land properties, key
factors that allowed public authorities to achieve their development goals.
3 Contextual factors
3.1 Property structure
Prior to the land readjustment initiated by the construction of the bypass road, anLand use no longer
corresponded with
property structure
important discrepancy existed between the effective rights granted to users and the
property structure (shape and owners of plots). A third of the property title holders
were no longer farmers (Besson and Courdesse, 1999): they had inherited the land
and were renting it. In addition, farmers had proceeded with various land exchanges
that had not been entered into the land registry, so the shape of plots did not fit
actual land uses. The initial perimeter (85 hectares based on the bypass road’s trace)
was transformed into a 317 hectare voluntary land readjustment area, including the
almost the entire agricultural territory of Cheseaux, and parts of Etagnières and
Morrens (Dubauloz and Courdesse, 2004).
The process of redefining the property structure, combined with the commune’sSimplification of the
property structure and
shape
intentions to develop land close to the village (from 1999 onwards), contributed to a
rise in the local land market. Figure 1 shows that between 1993 and 2001, the formal
property structure was greatly simplified to meet the actual uses: the number of plots
was reduced from 31 to 21 and the number of owners within the future perimeter of
the LIS Derrière-le-château shrunk from 15 to 7. Throughout the perimeter of the
land readjustment, there were initially 417 plots owned by 102 persons, and after the
readjustment, there were 93 owners, and 162 available remaining plots (Besson and
Courdesse, 1999).
Another element shown in figure 1 is the anchor of the urbanisation limits. BeforeAnchor of urbanisation
limits the land readjustment in 1993, these corresponded to the limit between intermediary
and agricultural zones (based on the initial bypass road plans designed from 1978).
After the readjustment in 2003, the path has been physically anchored by the bypass
tunnel: in fact, construction on top of the tunnel are prohibited.
The 2003 map (figure 1) shows the property structure after the LIS: the separationQuick development after
the LIS between agricultural and building zones has been clearly set and the plots formatted
for development.
The commune did not own a small portion of a plot that belonged to landowner
3. The commune bought it once the zoning and land readjustment had been done.
As of 2016, most of the plots have been developed, only the commune and landowner
3 still have some undeveloped building zone reserves.
It is notable that this quick development was accompanied by skyrocketing landExplosion of land prices
prices. Whereas a square meter of serviced land was estimated around 250CHF/m2
in 2003 (Marti and Courdesse, 2003), it is now estimated around 800CHF/m2 6.
6F. Blanc, former communal executive in charge of land use planning and construction, inter-
viewed in Cheseaux 24 February 2016.
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Year Land use planning changes Land use changes
1974 Popular vote rejecting cantonal financial support for
the construction of a bypass road for Cheseaux
1978 Adoption of the communal zoning plan separating agri-
cultural, intermediary and building zone
1980s Study of different options for the bypass road of Che-
seaux
1991 Cantonal authorities chose the western bypass option.
Launch of a mandatory land readjustment procedure in
the future road’s perimeter
1993 At the request of the landowners, extension of the land
readjustment perimeter for the entire agricultural zone
of Cheseaux and neighbour commune Morrens
1994 Public hearing on land values
1996 Examination of future property shape and values by
cantonal authorities
public hearing on future land service works
1999 Consultation procedure of the new communal zoning
plan
Public hearing on the new shape of plots and their
ownership, new land values and modified future land
service works for the land readjustment contournement
Entry into force of the communal structure plan and
the local structure plan Derrière-le-château
2000 Court decision on the future land service works of the
land readjustment
Entry into force of a local structure plan corresponding
to the perimeter of the future LIS Derrière-le-château
Elaboration of a feasibility study on the perimeter of
the LIS Derrière-le-château
2001 Entry into force of the new communal zoning plan
2002 Property transfer of the land readjustment contourne-
ment
Public hearing on public and private land service works
for the land readjustment contournement
Creation of the LIS Derrière-le-château
2003 Negotiations and public hearings on the perimeter,
land value and the future shape of plots within the LIS
Derrière-le-château
Land service works
for the land readjust-
ment bypass
2004 Adoption of the local development plan Derrière-le-
château by the cantonal authority
Approval of easements on future property shape by
landowners
Property transfer and entry into force of the local de-
velopment plan Derrière-le-château
Public hearing into land service for the LIS Derrière-le-
château
Final cost breakdown and dissolution of the land read-
justment contournement
2005 Cantonal authorisation on foreseen land service works Initiation of the land
service works for
the LIS Derrière-
le-château, first prop-
erty developments
2007 Arrival of first resid-
ents in Derrière-le-
château
2009 End of land service
works of the LIS
Derrière-le-château
2012 Public hearing on modified easements; cost breakdown
between landowners and realised land service works
2014 Final cost breakdown and dissolution of the LIS
Table 1: Main land use planning and land use changes in Cheseaux since 1993.
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Contextual factors
The ability of the LIS to simplify the property structure and reduce the number of A land development
machineowners are among its most outstanding features. This allows it to fit property to land
use planning needs, and to elaborate plans without being constrained by existing
private law constraints. Further, the LIS plays a decisive role in the negotiations
that authorities and landowners conduct on land development, such as valuation,
the modalities of land service and development, and other financial aspects. The
underlying explanatory causes for this simplification are further researched in section
4.4.
3.2 Demographic evolution
Demographic changes contribute to the evolution of land uses. These changes are Demographic explosion
since 2002particularly significant in Cheseaux. From 1980 to 1990, population grew from 2,393
to 2,806 (BFS, 2015). Between 1990 and 2002, the commune’s population was rather
constant, it grew by approximately 100 inhabitants per year,reach 4,080 inhabitants in
2014 (+1,300 inhabitants or +45% growth between 1990 and 2014). In comparison,
the rural district of the Gros-de-Vaud in the north of Cheseaux has grown from
27,000 to 42,100 inhabitants (+15,200 or +56%). The urban district of Lausanne (to
which Cheseaux belongs) has grown from 146,000 to 158,700 inhabitants (+12,700 or
+8.7%) over the same time period. The regional comparison shows that the majority
of the region’s population growth took place outside of the agglomeration. Further,
the region’s demographic growth is far above cantonal (31%) and national (22%)
population growth rates.
The demographic growth, combined with the old and progressively undersized The need of a new school
primary school building, helped the commune to develop its infrastructure. Looking
for a location to establish the new school, officials concluded that the best location
would be next to the existing primary school7.
From 2006 onwards, this growth was partially absorbed by the construction in the Growth leads to more
growthLIS’ perimeter, whose capacity, in theory, is estimated at 800 inhabitants (Commune
of Cheseaux, 2003). However, as two plots remain unbuilt8, the effective capacity in
2016 is estimated at 500 inhabitants. The agglomeration’s master plan foresees the
arrival of additional inhabitants and jobs (1,600 cumulatively) within the commune
by 2020 (Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012a, 87).
3.3 Accessibility
Transport connections are particularly salient in accounting for the growth of Che- Intersection of five
cantonal roadsseaux. Its location outside of the urban agglomeration, yet only 9 kilometres from
the core of Lausanne creates a complex situation for Cheseaux. In terms of motor-
ised transport, Cheseaux is at the intersection of five cantonal roads that connect the
Gros-de-Vaud with the urban south. Cheseaux’s location at the point of connection
with the urban south contributes to heavy traffic. The bypass road alone was not able
to alleviate the traffic situation, and has led policymakers to reorient transit towards
the motorway (SDNL, 2015). There are two motorway exits about five kilometres
away from the village centre – one in the direction of Yverdon-les-bains or Geneva,
and the other at the northern limit of Lausanne’s agglomeration, in the direction of
Montreux or Berne.
In terms of public transport, Cheseaux is served by a train (every 15 minutes) Direct train to the
agglomeration’s corewhich takes 19 minutes to reach Lausanne’s centre. The frequency of service doubled
in 2015, to increase the line’s transport capacities. The train line is considered a
structural element in the agglomeration’s public transport network, and Cheseaux is
considered a local node (Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012b, 87). The large part of
part of the commune’s settlement is located within 500 metres or less from the train
station. Various unbuilt areas still remain within this perimeter. The proximity to
the agllomeration’s center, the existing transport infrastructure and the existence of
unbuilt plots point towards an important development of the commune (SDNL, 2007;
Agglomération Lausanne-Morges, 2008). As noticed by the agglomeration’s master
plan (Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012b, 55), a weakness of the current infrastructure
7François Blanc, op. cit.
8As figure 1 shows, the commune and landowner 3 still have a building zone reserve on their plot.
17 of 31
Land improvement syndicate in Cheseaux
is the lack of tangential connections that would make it possible to commute to other
parts of the agglomeration without passing through the centre.
The contextual factors presented provide an overall explanation of land use changes
in Cheseaux: the quick and effective preparation of land for development, the import-
ant demographic growth of the region, the good connection to transport infrastructure
and booming land prices position Cheseaux as a small growth machine. A closer look
at one of the causes of this change, the transformation of the property structure,
unveils a set of legal constraints intrinsic to the LIS that have allowed such quick
and effective changes. The role of soft law can be observed, along with the minimal
density obligations tacitly introduced into the land use plans’ approval process.
4 Constraints of superior law
4.1 Procedural constraints of the land improvement syndicate
Among the legal aspects that shape the LIS’ functioning, five key elements contribute
to its successful implementation:
1. the definition of a perimeter9: the LIS’ initial perimeter is usually predefined by
a communal and/or local structure plan. This plan is non-binding for landown-
ers, i.e. does not grant them any additional rights apart from what the zoning
plan foresees. This point is crucial, because the future building rights are gran-
ted only when the land is readjusted, providing an incentive to go through the
LIS process. Further, the perimeter of the LIS itself creates an impermeable
border that binds involved actors and excludes third party interference . A club
is constituted that benefits from a new property structure and new development
rights;
2. the mandatory conduct of a feasibility study10: the study determines how many
plots are included into the perimeter, and thus, how many landowners are
involved. The study also estimates the rough added economic value created
through the additional development rights granted by the LIS. Further, the
landowners’ reactions to the study and its subsequent approval or rejection is a
first test which can reveal the owners’ preferences. This can indicate not only
their will to cooperate (or not), but also the type of value they expect to derive
from the LIS (essentially land for development or agricultural land);
3. the coordination process as the temporary joint production of a new property
structure and of a local development plan: the land readjustment plan and the
local development plan are examined simultaneously by cantonal authorities and
together submitted for public hearings. The approval by cantonal authorities of
both plans is conditioned on their adoption by the respective parties (communal
authorities or landowners) and the resolution of potential opposition11. Without
coordination, the property structure and the zoning plan would be out of sync,
a recurrent problem in the classical implementation of land use planning policy
through zoning plans (Gilg and Kelly, 1997);
4. the equal treatment of landowners12: the added economic value that is created
must be shared among all involved landowners according to the surface of land
they possess and the initial value of their land (mainly dependent on zoning).
The added economic value transferred to landowners can consist of additional
land (mostly likely agricultural land without development rights), additional
building rights or monetary compensation, depending on their wishes (see sec-
tion 5.4). Further, the value redistribution process has to include all nearby
landowners whose land might be developed in the future. The law speaks of a
"geographical unit"13. Communal planning documents and the existing urban
9Art. 30, SR-VD 913.11.
10Art. 85, SR-VD 913.11.
11Art. 4, SR-VD 913.11; art. 58, SR-VD 700.11.
12Art. 8, SR 101.
13Art. 52, SR-VD 913.11.
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morphology serve as references to the definition of theunit. This legal condi-
tion reduces the risk of successful legal action by landowners against decisions
taken by the LIS’ assembly or the LIS itself. In the case of the LIS Derrière-
le-château, the equal treatment constraint was determined by the intermediary
zone. It requires the inclusion of all contiguous owners of land in this zone.
5. the simple majority rule (one landowner, one vote) that applies to decisions of
the landowner’s assembly fosters land use changes for two main reasons:
(a) prior to the creation of a syndicate, landowners are not actively pushed to
develop their land: despite the attribution of new rights (e.g. development
rights), they continue to use it as they did before (e.g. for agriculture).
Once the commune has expressed its intentions to develop a new neigh-
bourhood, and convinced a majority of landowners to agree, the other
owners are bound to follow the majority’s decision, which, together with
the subsequent costs (see section 5.1), provides momentum for land use
change.
(b) when the new property lines, use rights, easements, compensations and
future land service are discussed, the pressure of majority voting applies
to all landowners. This pressure is not absolute, because landowners can
legally oppose the assembly’s votes. Rather, it is a constraint that drives
landowners, advised by the experts’ commission, to seek compromise, and
reduces the probability of opposition by landowners.
Through the simultaneous redefinition of public (zoning) and private law (prop- Minimisation of existing
legal constraintserty) regulations, the LIS minimizes existing legal constraints within a chosen peri-
meter and thus allows to entirely rethink future land use. Accompanied by chosen
experts, the majority rule grants every owner the possibility to influence the decision
process without allowing them to dominate or block it.
4.2 Cropland protection plan
Since the introduction of the federal cropland protection plan in the 1990s, the cantons Obligation to compensate
have been obligated to preserve a certain quota of their most valuable agricultural
soil.
In the canton of Vaud, the entire intermediary zone was part of the cropland
protection plan. As mentioned in section 1, former building zones were zoned into
intermediary zones in order to implement the federal urgent decree of 1972. If the
canton had defined only the agricultural zone as part of the cropland protection plan,
they would not have been able to reach the quota imposed by the Confederation. In
order to maintain the quota, any development of intermediary zone required compens-
ation, that is to say the definition of new surfaces as part of the cropland protection
plan. Otherwise, the proof that a new development meets an important cantonal ob-
jective that could not have been appropriately reached without using cropland has to
be made by communal (or cantonal) authorities. In such a case, the canton subtracts
cropland reserves from its reserve quota14.
The urbanisation projects of the two LIS Derrière-le-château and Nonceret took A posteriori compensation
place on cropland, and therefore required compensation. In the case of the LIS
Derrière-le-château, the commune justified their compensation measures, stating that
during the zoning plan revision of 2001, several areas zoned as intermediary had been
zoned as agricultural. Thus, the loss of agricultural land used by the LIS Derrière-le-
château had already been compensated for during the revision of building regulations.
This delayed compensation was accepted by the canton.
Due to the 2014 federal moratorium prohibiting any extension of the building zone, LIS Nonceret suspend by
federal moratoriumthe delayed compensation cannot be applied to the LIS Nonceret for now15. Until
the cantonal structure plan is approved by the Confederation, zoning operation must
be compensated by an equivalent building zone converted to agricultural zone. The
federal spatial planning office’s logic is that oversized building zones from peripheral
communes without transport connections would have to be transferred to more central
14See also art. 30 of the Spatial planning ordinance of the 28 June 2000, SR 700.1.
15U. Zuppinger and R. Courdesse, op. cit.
19 of 31
Land improvement syndicate in Cheseaux
locations prior to any new development. For growing communes like Cheseaux, this
can represent an incentive to cooperate with rural communes struggling to reduce
their building zones.
4.3 Master plans
According to Lausanne’s agglomeration master plan (Canton de Vaud and ALM,Cheseaux as strategic
sector 2012b, 93), Cheseaux and Romanel, (two communes close and well connected to the
city centre), are part of a strategic sector intended for urbanisation . In Cheseaux,
this future urbanisation is meant to take place in the west and east areas of the village,
for continuity with existing construction (Agglomération Lausanne-Morges, 2008, 71).
The intercommunal master plan for the northern part of the agglomeration (schéma
directeur du Nord lausannois – SDNL) sets urbanisation limits in the west along the
tunnel of the bypass road (SDNL, 2007, 117), on the new agricultural zone set by the
LIS Derrière-le-château.
In terms of population density, the agglomeration’s 2008 master plan sets the ob-Minimal density
requirements jective of 200 jobs and inhabitants per hectare within strategic sites, primarily along
Cheseaux’s train line (Agglomération Lausanne-Morges, 2008, 71). The intercom-
munal master plan SDNL has planned, on average densities of 165 inhabitants and
jobs per hectare (SDNL, 2007, 85). The revised agglomeration’s master plan expects
the development of several parts of Cheseaux by 2020 with an average density of 160
inhabitants and jobs per hectare (Canton de Vaud and ALM, 2012a, 87)16. In order
to ensure the realisation of such densities, the cantonal authority examines all zoning
plans for compliance with the benchmarks in the agglomeration’s master plans (SDT,
2012). Unlike any other zoning plan defining such densities, these master plans set
criteria despite never having been adopted by a legislative body.
4.4 Financial incentives
One central aspect that contributes to the ability of the LIS to redistribute value areHow land becomes
valuable the financial incentives provided by the instrument’s use: the granting of additional
rights aids the LIS implementation of land use planning policy goals. The value
creation process can be divided into five steps, (the first two being in reality one
single procedure):
1. the first step consists in, if necessary, the reduction of (potentially) constructible
surface through the local development plan part of the LIS process;
2. next, the experts commission suggests an allocation of new development rights
or higher plot ratios on the (reduced) surface of the perimeter to be developed.
A sufficient amount of added economic value must be created to make the
operation profitable for all landowners;
3. the new rights are granted to the new plots: the local development plan enters
into force and the new property structure is entered into the land registry;
4. these new rights allow the landowners to collectively (via the LIS), or individu-
ally mortgage their land to cover future land service costs;
5. once the land is serviced, landowners can either sell their plot to, or contract a
developer.
Figure 2 shows that the economic value created by the LIS can be significant, inThe value multiplying
coefficient relative (difference between initial and final land value), and in absolute terms (net
gains). The difference between the initial and final land values principally depends
on:
− the type of zone that pre-exists within the perimeter;
− the quantitative amount (surface) of new building zone;
− the plot ratio of the (old and) new building zone.
16These areas are to be developed through the local development plans of la Rochette, Est-
Cheseaux, Nonceret-la Croix, route d’Yverdon and Grand-pré Lacuessière.
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Initial land value Final land value
Building zone 
with higher 
plot ratio
500 – 
1000 CHF/m2
Land service
50 CHF/m2
Planning
10 CHF/m2
Agricultural zone
4 CHF/m2
La
nd
 v
al
ue
To be financed 
directly by the land 
owners and through 
a mortgage
Serves as 
mortgage guarantee
Intermediary zone
20 CHF/m2
Building zone 
with low plot 
ratio
200 CHF/m2
Agricultural zone
4 CHF/m2
Time
Figure 2: Land value change in a land improvement syndicate over time.
The difference between initial and final land values are referred to as the value
multiplying coefficient, i.e. a ratio that quantifies the value change and allows each
landowner to calculate the proportionate share of added value due to them. Table 2
in section 6 presents this ratio more in detail.
The financial aspects of the LIS provide incentives for the landowners to fulfill the Initial costs to be carried
directly by the ownersinstrument’s goals, but they also constitute a hurdle : the financial investment re-
quired from the landowners (many having inherited the land), constitutes a barrier
that, in practice, reduces the number of actors involved. The LIS needs to cover
running and planning costs, which means that prior to the entry into force of a new
property structure and zoning plan, the actors will have already made financial contri-
butions. Combined with the subsequent land service costs, these elements constitute
a financial hurdle that landowners need to overcome. The initial costs must be paid
directly by the landowners, whereas once the property transfer and zoning changes
have occurred, they have the option to use a mortgage to pay for the land service,
planning and (a portion of) development costs.
As a consequence, some landowners, rather than participating in the full LIS How value crowds owners
outprocess, prefer to sell or exchange their land prior to the syndicate’s creation. In this
case of early sale, the price is at an intermediate level, between the initial and final
value (estimated value at the end of the process). As figure 1 shows, between 1993
and 2001, the number of owners has been significantly reduced. Section 5.1 provides
a more detailed explanation of these changes.
The legal characteristics of the LIS instrument permits the creation of a closed
group of equally-treated, development-friendly landowners benefiting from facilitated
decisional rules and minimised legal constraints which allow them to achieve their
land use planning policy goals. As I have shown, the added value created through
the attribution of new rights provides a strong incentive to cooperate. The next
section presents how the land readjustment and zoning operations work in practice,
and the value distribution arrangements made by involved actors in the case of the
LIS Derrière-le-château.
5 Local regulatory arrangement
5.1 Active communal land use policy
Looking into the involved actors’ strategies, I examine how the commune, who did not The best location
own any land within the LIS perimeter (see figure 1), managed to acquire 17,353m2 of
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land on the most central plots. As presented by the interviewees17, communal motives
for this precise land acquisition were clear: the construction of a new primary school.
The old building required an extensive renovation, and had become too small for the
expected needs. After looking for the various potential locations18 and discussing
possible options with the contracted planner19, the commune decided to establish
the new primary school close to the old school and to reuse the old school for the
communal administration. Further, the optimal location of the entire area, located
in the heart of Cheseaux, just behind the castle and only 200 metres from the train
station, lent itself well to wider development.
The projected surface of development and the fragmented property structureCrowding out of
landowners would not have allowed each small owner one individual plot in the final property
state. They would have been obliged to become co-owners. Further, (Commune of
Cheseaux, 2001), several owners did not intend to develop, nor take part in the LIS
which involved costs prior to any monetary gain. These costs led to a "crowding out"
of the owners not willing to pay for them, either because they did not intend to develop
their future property, or because they simply did not want to engage in a complex,
cooperative financial operation whose benefits are collected later on. The fact that
most of these persons inherited the land they own makes many of them unaware of the
price of land and hampers their will to pay for something they have always owned20.
This financial hurdle not only led to a reduction of participants and simplified future
negotiations, as the remaining owners were willing to invest in and proceed with the
LIS. It also strengthened the power of the remaining, more entrepreneurial landowners
within the LIS. This "crowding out" effect presented an opportunity for the commune.
The land from these small owners was sold to the commune at the attractive price
of 35CHF/m2. In addition to these acquisitions, the commune also exchanged plots
with owners unwilling to sell, for larger agricultural plots (these plots, though within
communal property, were outside of the perimeter)21. These exchanges preceded the
zoning and property changes made by the LIS Derrière-le-château. They took place
when both the agricultural land readjustment and building regulations revision were
still in progress. These simultaneous revision processes allowed the commune and
the landowners in the intermediate zone to anticipate future changes and elaborate a
strategy based on their interests:
− the landowners had the possibility to remain in the intermediate zone, increase
their agricultural land property by exchanging their ideally located plots with
the commune for larger ones further away from the settlement, or sell their plot
in the intermediary zone22;
− the commune could, at the same time, acquire land property in the intermediary
zone, reduce the fragmentation of the existing property structure and, through
the LIS, redesign the property shape and use.
5.2 Communal development under stress
As argued by the communal executive23, Cheseaux was under pressure to build itsFeasibility study as a lift
for change new school, and was thus interested in the quick realisation of the LIS. The com-
munal executive body pre-financed the feasibility study, fostering discussions among
landowners regarding upcoming decisions. After the feasibility study confirmed the
probable success of the operation, the communal executive body requested a credit to
its legislative body (Commune of Cheseaux, 2002). According to the interviewees24,
this commitment lent momentum to the LIS process.
17F. Blanc, op. cit. R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, op. cit.; G. Conus and D. Villiger, urban
technician and urban planner of the commune of Cheseaux, interviewed in Cheseaux 12 January
2016.
18Free available plots next to the secondary school as well as other communal plots close to a
major road were also considered, but in the end the former was kept for a potential extension of the
secondary school and the latter were considered too dangerous.
19Until 2005, the commune did not have any internal planning staff, but worked for several decades
with the same planner.
20R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, op. cit..
21F. Blanc, op. cit.
22R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, op. cit.
23F. Blanc, op. cit.
24R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, F. Blanc, op. cit.
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TheIt commune could not afford to wait too long to find a compromise with the Time as main constraint
for the communeother landowners on elements such as the location of the owners’ future property,
the plot ratio and the constraints of the local development plan (location and type
of roads, division of land service costs, creation of a green corridor, subterranean car
parks, playgrounds). The location of the commune’s future plots was an (almost)
non-negotiable element: the commune wanted to build the school in the most central
location, adjacent to the existing institutional zone where the old school was located.
As a consequence, in order to keep on schedule, but also to minimise implementation
gaps that it potentially faced when negotiating with the other landowners, it agreed
to the following elements:
− the plot ratios had to be set at a level providing a sufficient financial levy for the
involved parties. The maximum plot ratio ever applied on communal territory25,
0.6, was used for a third of the construction in the LIS perimeter;
− the creation of an east-west green corridor crossing the northern part of the
perimeter was heavily contested by the concerned landowner, because it oblig-
ated him to bury the car parks and invest additional funds in the corridor’s
realisation. Therefore, the commune agreed not only to carry the associated
production and maintenance costs, but also extract from the LIS’ redistributive
process a thin (non-valuable) strip of land along the road in the west, and to
pay for the trees (and their maintenance). Additionally, the former communal
representative pointed out the absence of a playground in the green corridor,
despite this being an obligation for the landowner (according to the local devel-
opment plan).
− the commune also agreed to designate their land reserves as building land
(190CHF/m2) and not as public land (95CHF/m2) like the school ground, al-
though its intentions for it are not settled for now. In case of development, these
land reserves would require additional service costs (such as a road) beyond what
the costs that have been covered by the LIS.
− another concession linked to the previous ones is the small plot of land in the
center east (see the 2003 map on figure 1). The commune had to buy this plot
from one of the owners after the LIS procedure had ended in order to possess a
plot shape fit for development. Because the commune had already covered its
value claims in the LIS, it had to acquire the plot separately.
The commune had to make concessions in regard to the valuation of its land, to
cover the costs of the development obligations set by the local development plan, and
the uncovered land service costs of its undeveloped land reserve.
5.3 Car parks
In regard to the car parks, several different positions have bee advocated by the
urban planner, the communal executive body, the communal technical services and
the landowners. The urban planner argued that since the future construction would
be within walking distance of the train station, the number of parks could be reduced
below the official norms foreseen by the VSS. For this reduced number of parks,
the excavation of soil and the parks’ burial was not needed, and would unnecessarily
degrade the soil. The communal executivebody was convinced by the necessity to bury
the parks, but unsure about their quantity. The communal administration insisted
on the fulfilment of the official norms, regardless of the proximity of the train station.
The landowners were divided on the question of the car park burial. This mixture of
opinions left the matter unsolved in the local development plan, which in turn led to
the construction of numerous car parks, mostly above ground.
5.4 The role of the experts commission
The experts’ commission is hired by the landowners. They have the urban, legal and Chief negotiators
economic expertise needed to meet the landowners’ objectives. Their position between
25F. Blanc, op. cit.
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the syndicate and the commune, as well as their professional knowledge grants them
the capacity to anticipate future constraints (e.g. during the site’s development or
effective use), moderate (if necessary) the owners’ wishes, balance the commune’s and
the owners interests, ensure their equal treatment, etc. But at the same time they
fulfill two purposes that can be contradictory: any additional obligation of constraint
defined in the zoning plan lowers the profit margin of the landowner and is subject
to contention, because the experts commission is hired and paid by the landowners.
At the time of the LIS Derrière-le-château, the commune did not have internal plan-
ning expertise and therefore relied solely on the LIS’ experts who, as it was shown
for the car parks, were in conflict against both the landowners and the communal
administration. Thus, in the present case, the experts commission defended both the
public administrative authorities and the public policy’s target group, (this includes
the commune).
These arrangements show that the lack of internal expertise, time, and property
on site led the commune to grant an extended share of the economic value created
through the LIS to the landowners. This term, "extended share," indicates how the
"equal treatment" constraint was applied in a way that favoured the landowners.
6 Impact on value creation and redistribution
Table 2 shows the different surfaces and values before and after the implementationThreefold value increase
of the LIS, as well as the land value in 2016. It also shows the value multiplying
coefficient of the LIS Derrière-le-château: 2.84. It is the ratio between the final land
value (without land service costs) and the initial land value. This almost threefold
increase in value was a strong argument for landowners with financial interests to
participate in the LIS.
Considering land prices in 201626, I can see that the land value has almost tripledTime factor central to
the control of land value again. However, the actors could have only marginally anticipated such a price in-
crease. This value change is attributed to regional market conditions during that
specific period, as the LIS does not regulate value in time, but only redistributes its
amount and location at one precise moment.
The initial price of the intermediary zone (20CHF/m2) is set tacitly by the expertsActual land value even
higher commission of the LIS27. It can be considered artificial for two reasons:
1. the zone is defined by law as unbuildable, and therefore not worth more than
regular agricultural zone. As the revision of Cheseaux’s zoning plan in 2001
showed, the risk that authorities will have to compensate the "value loss" in
case of zone change from intermediary to agricultural zone is almost non-existent
because agricultaral land is not serviced,and under the purview of the cropland
protection plan (see section 4.2);
2. the perimeter initially considered includes the entire perimeter of the LIS. But
if the intermediary zone is valued the same as agricultural zone, then one should
only include the surface effectively dedicated to development in the calculation.
Therefore, I propose an alternative way of calculating the land’s actual economicAn added economic value
of 8.7 millions francs value based on agricultural land prices and the perimeter that has effectively been
zoned. In comparison to the first (official) method that shows a value increase of 6.1
million francs, the second method shows an added value of 8.7 million francs (see
table 3). This second calculation method can be criticised, because it assimilates the
intermediary zone to a regular agricultural zone (it is in fact part of the cropland
protection plan). Further, it neglects the equal treatment constraint that is a ne-
cessary condition of the LIS use, because it excludes from the part of the plots in
the intermediary zone from syndicate’s perimeter (see section 4.1). However, the non
considered agricultural land remains in the hands of the landowners and therefore
imparts (future) added value. It is reasonable to believe that, in the medium term,
some portion of these surfaces will be developed (SDNL, 2015).
An important element is the learning effect on the involved actors after havingLearning effect
26800CHF/m2 according to M. Blanc, op. cit.
27R. Courdesse, geometer and U. Zuppinger, urban planner, interviewed in Echallens 14 January
2016.
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State Surface CHF/m2 Absolute value Zone
2001 158,031m2 20CHF/m2 3,160,620CHF Intermediary
2003 43,092m2 189CHF/m2 8,164,000CHF Building zone
105,565m2 3.83CHF/m2 404,300CHF Agricultural zone
8,136m2 95CHF/m2 772,900CHF Institutional zone
1,238m2 7CHF/m2 8,700CHF Green zone
9,349,700CHF Total
Table 2: Land values in the LIS Derrière-le-château in 2001 and 2003s. Data: Marti and
Courdesse (2003, 2012). The surfaces considered do not include public domain nor the
"neutralised" plots.
Absolute value Description
9,349,700CHF Final land value
-3,160,600CHF Initial land value
6,189,300CHF Added value
8,945,400CHF Final land value without
agricultural zone
-200,900CHFa Theoretical initial land value
8,744,500CHF Theoretical added value
Table 3: Added land value in the LIS Derrière-le-château. Data: Marti and Courdesse (2003,
2012). The surfaces considered do not include public domain nor the "neutralised" plots.
a(Surface of perimeter - argicultural zone)*agricultural land price: (158,031m2-
105,565m2)*3.83CHF/m2=200,900CHF
experienced a land readjustment and two land improvement syndicates. The second
land improvement syndicate Nonceret is still active, but the involved landowners, some
of whom were present in the first LIS Derrière-le-château, pushed for the realisation
of the second. The commune wanted to stagger both LIS in time, because they did
not have the organisational means, nor, possibly, the political support, to initiate two
development projects at the same time. But once the LIS Derrière-le-château was
finished, the commune hired a professional planner and they launched into agreement
with the concerned landowners, the LIS Nonceret. A safe assumption is that all
parties had learned the benefits they could gain from the first LIS.
The actors’ interests in using the LIS instrument can be linked to the coalition Small growth machine
of actors created by the LIS’ coordination mechanism between the landowners’ as-
sembly and the local development plan: factors such common objectives between the
commune and (at least part of) the landowners to develop the land, the definition
of an impermeable perimeter where all actors share proportionately the gains they
create, the resources that actors share (infrastructure, money, information), and the
wide margin of manoeuvrability they are granted in the definition of plot ratios, land
service and type of construction, creates a community of interests whose production
results in a huge amount of added value, (see table 2) primarily to the benefit of the
landowners.
Limits of the LIS to a more extensive redistribution
The capacity of one tenacious landowner to substantially lengthen the process shows Limit of the number of
landownersone of the weaknesses of the instrument: despite the removal of the double major-
ity rule28 in 1997, the inclusion of landowners who systematically opposed the LIS
process, such as in the case of the LIS of Bussigny or Le Mont, can noticeably slow
down the instrument’s implementation29. Experts recommend not to exceed 10 to 15
different owners within one LIS30.
An additional element that the LIS does not anticipate is the common develop- No common real estate
development
28Majority of the landowners and of the landowners that represent the majority in terms of surface
29D. Leroy, Land readjustment engineer, cantonal spatial planning office, interviewed in Lausanne
25 September 2015.
30U. Zuppinger and R. Courdesse, op. cit.
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Estimated surfaces and values
Gross floor areaa: 24,600m2
Construction volumeb 98,400m3
Construction costsc: 68.5M
Land service costs: 2.6M
Table 4: Estimated surfaces and values of the land dedicated to development in the area
Derrière-le-château.
aThe estimated gross floor area has been calculated based on a plot ratio of 0.35 for 5,000m2 of
building zone and 0.6 for 38,100m2 building zone (Marti and Courdesse, 2003).
b24,600m2/3 = 8,200m2 of used ground surface. For three floor dwellings with 4 meters height
per floor: 12*8,200m2 = 98,4000m3.
cBased on a price of 580CHF/m3 + 20% for additional costs and landscape modelling (Unknown,
nd): 696CHF/m3*98,400m3=68.5M
Estimated benefits and costs
Gross rental income per yeara: +4.7M
Operational expensesb: -0.95M
Gross annual financial return on total investmentsc: 5.9%
Mortgage interestsd: -3.2M
Net annual financial return on capitale : 6.8%
Net yield per year: 0.48M
Table 5: Estimated benefits and costs of the development of the perimeter Derrière-le-
château.
aBased on an occupancy rate of 0.85 and a rental value of 19CHF/m2/month. The price hypo-
thesis is one of the values used for the real estate calculation including car parks made for the LIS’
assembly (Unknown, nd).
bThis sum corresponds to 20 % of the gross rental income. Based on https://d-l.ch/fr/
articles/les-rendements-brut-et-net.
c4.7M (gross income) / (70.1M (value of construction and land service) + 8.1M (value of land))
= 5.9%
d4.5% is the rate of reference for the canton of Geneva in 2001. See http://www.asloca.ch/
evolution-des-taux-hypothécaires-de-référence-canton-de-genève. I assume that the entirety
of construction and land service costs are financed via mortgage. Therefore: 70.1M*4.5%=3.2M
e(4.7M (gross rental income) - 0.95M (operation expenses) - 3.2M (mortgage interests) / 8.1M
(invested land value)) = 6.7%
26 of 31
Impact on value creation and redistribution
ment of land. The LIS process stops once the land is serviced. The various interests
of landowners and their respective financial capacities, leads to separate development
processes. Common aesthetic criteria depend solely upon communal or local building
regulations. In the case of Cheseaux, the owners preferred to fully control the devel-
opment of their own land, according to their own financial capacities and the planned
type of occupation (rental, freehold).
With the revision of the federal spatial planning act in 2014 and the re-introduction 1 million francs potential
revenues from the tax on
the added land value
of the tax on added land value created by zoning, the mandatory tax of 20% of the
added value will impact the value multiplying coefficient (the gains) for landowners.
Reading from table 2, the sole gain created by zoning is the difference between the
value of the building zone31 and the value of the intermediary zone: amounting to 4.87
million francs. A 20% tax could have captured roughly one million francs and lowered
the value multiplying coefficient from 2.87 to 2.54. Based on these estimations, the
introduction of the new tax will, in my opinion, not impact the functioning of the
instrument in future implementation processes that have a similar value multiplying
coefficient.
However, since 2013, the communes in Vaud have also had the possibility to apply Potential 2.58 million
francs of extended land
service tax
the extended land service tax, which Cheseaux did in 2013 (Commune of Cheseaux,
2013). The tax amounts approximately to 82CHF/m2 for housing surfaces. In the
case of the LIS Derrière-le-château, the tax could have amounted to 1.51M francs32.
If both taxes had been combined, a net gain of approximately 2.39 million would have
remained for the landowners, which corresponds to a taxation of 72% of the added
land value created by zoning. According to the Federal Tribunal33 and to a report of
a commission from the cantonal parliament (Canton of Vaud, 2014), such a taxation
would not be considered confiscatory.
Referring to the land value estimation calculation elaborated by mandate of the Annual revenue of
480,000 francslandowners’ assembly (Unknown, nd), the yearly gross rental income of the building
zone in the perimeter of the LIS Derrière-le-château can be estimated at around 3.6M
francs. If I estimate operation expenses of 720,000CHF (see table 5), and a mortgage
interest rate of 4.5%, the annual gain can be estimated at around 480,000CHF for the
entire building zone of the LIS, which corresponds to a net financial return on capial
(land value) of 6.8%.
The comparison between the financial gain generated by the properties to the Taxed added economic
value recovered within
seven years
sum of the taxes, (on added land value and of the extended service tax), shows the
importance of time as a factor when dealing with land value and its redistribution.
Taking into consideration what landowners invested, they should recover the taxed
added economic value within seven years. I deduce that these two value capture
instruments are only able to grasp a limited amount of the economic value when a
zone change occurs, a very specific and unique moment in time. The effectively created
economic value, (the rent), is paid every month and year. The two taxes are only
marginally able to seize the value added over time. In fact, the land price referenced
for the calculation of the tax on added land value created by zoning, reflects the land
rent over time, but only up to a certain point (application of lowered market prices)
and not as a perpetual factor, as opposed to the financial return from land ownership.
LIS on multiple sites?
One of the main problems that land policy currently faces is the relocation of oversized
and undeveloped building zones from small peri-urban communes where no develop-
ment takes place and where access by public transport is inadequate to more central
urban communes that drive development. Until now, most LIS have been used on
limited portions of the territory (with exception of the LIS Le Mont), within one
commune or across two communes. In order to address the problem of the location of
undeveloped building zones, it would be necessary to broaden the scale of implement-
ation of the instrument and stretch the instrument’s perimeter across two or more
distinct locations. Based on the findings from this case study, and the advice of the
experts interviewed34, one should pay attention to the following elements:
31The tax does not apply to land dedicated to public infrastructure.
3218,450m2*82CHF/m2.
33ATF 105 Ia 134.
34R. Courdesse and U. Zuppinger, op. cit.
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− the number of landowners involved has to remain small, otherwise the chances
of finding a suitable compromise is diminished. More specifically, the values
attributed to the different plots becomes an issue for the owners: they contest
the equal/unequal valuation of their land, (the principle of equal treatment
is a central constraint that has to be fulfilled for the implementation of the
LIS). Optimally, the perimeter of a multi-site LIS should consider only parts of
communal territories that belong to a restricted number of owners;
− the definition of a "sending area" in one commune and of a "receiving area"
in another commune requires both communes to cooperate, for example by
"synchronising" the transfer: both zoning plan revisions would have to take
place (be approved by the canton) at the same time in order to be recognised
as an effective transfer. But more importantly, the communes should both
be interested in doing the deal. In 2015, various communes with undeveloped
oversized building zones appeared reluctant to transfer these rights (24 heures,
2015a,b). Further, in the rights transfer process, the desired profits of the
sending owners might not align with expectations of profit for those receiving.
On the side of the "receiving area", the commune that augments its building zone
or plot ratio (in case of densification) needs to show an interest in development,
which depends, for now, upon the communal legislative body’s opinion on the
matter35;
− The heterogeneity of the landowners’ interests facilitates the realisation of a
LIS: if all landowners want agricultural land or all want building zone, then
the landowners’ wishes cannot be satisfied, either because there is not enough
(agricultural) land surface available, or because the property structure would
become too fragmented to be developed. The same thought would apply to a
multi-site syndicate: exchange of development rights is only possible between
communes with different demographic and economic dynamics and between
landowners with different interests (agriculture v. development).
35However, those communes part of Lausanne’s agglomeration master plan have minimal density
criteria that they need to fulfil. See also section 4.3.
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